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‘HAVING A ROAD ’ : SOC IAL AND SPAT IAL
MOB IL ITY OF PERSONS OF SLAVE AND MIXED
DESCENT IN POST - INDEPENDENCE CENTRAL
MALI *
BY LOTTE PELCKMANS
Centre of African Studies, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales
ABSTRACT: This article examines the migration trajectories of individuals of slave
descent and ‘mixed descent’ (children of slave concubines) in a royal family
network from the Haayre region of central Mali. Focusing on the twentieth
century, it considers the extent to which social status has deﬁned options for
mobility within this network. Its argument is twofold. First, it shows that attention
should be paid not only to the slave/free divide but also to subtler hierarchical
nuances such as mixed descent and royal slavery. Rather than social status per se, it
is internal hierarchies within social status groups which deﬁned a person’s options
for movement. Second, the mobile trajectories of people with royal slave status
tended to be intertwined with and depend on the movements of their patrons.
Although these dependent forms of migration hardly ever changed their social
status, they improved their economic condition considerably.
KEY WORDS: West Africa, Mali, slavery, abolition, migration.
DALLA (Fig. ) is a small village in the central Malian Sahel, east of the
Niger and at the fringes of the northern Malian desert (Fig. ). In this FulKe
village, members of the ruling elites in power since the precolonial period
continue to hold the main political positions of chief and mayor to date. In
spite of the potentially democratizing eﬀects of decentralization, old elites
maintain their political supremacy and continue to rank above clients who
were once slaves. Despite major changes in Mali’s political organization over
the past century, there seems to be more continuity than change in this
stratiﬁed FulKe rural community. An analysis of the internal hierarchical
dynamics in relation to the migration trajectories of diﬀerent status groups of
this community will demonstrate, however, that this continuity is only
superﬁcial.
To what extent does social status (slave or freeborn ancestry) deﬁne
opportunities for mobility, both socially and spatially? In the Fulfulde
language, the expression ‘having a road’ (hebbude laawol) underscores
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the relation between spatial and social opportunities. The ‘road’ represents
both the metaphoric road to social promotion and the material roads followed
by people in their travels. This metaphor is tied to a lingering pastoral
ideology among FulKe, even when used by sedentarized speakers. It matches
the historical experiences of FulKe nomads, who used to elude the demands of
Fig. . Haayre region and Gourma region of Mali. Overview of former FulKe
kingdoms of Booni, Dalla, and Joona ruled by Dicko families.
 Hebbude laawol in Fulfulde literally means ‘to have a road’ and suggests that one has
options (for example, to migrate, or not). Laawol means ‘a path’ or ‘a road’, but in a
symbolic sense can mean ‘a possibility’ or ‘an option’.
 On mobility as a way of life associated with pastoralist FulKe nomads in West Africa,
see R. Botte, J. Boutrais, and J. Schmitz (eds.), Figures peules (Paris, ),  and –.
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political authorities by moving away and trying their luck elsewhere, thereby
avoiding subordination. Rather than focusing on pastoralist mobility, this
article examines the mobility of sedentarized FulKe who settled in the Haayre
region, a semi-arid zone situated east of the Niger (Fig. ). Most studies on
FulKe mobility in Mali have considered pastoralists from the inner Niger, an
area which has hitherto received more attention from anthropologists and
historians.
A second innovative aspect of this study is its focus on the social trajectories
of mixed-descent individuals (a term preferred here because it does not imply
the lack or incompleteness suggested by expressions such as half-breed and
semi-freeborn). Haayre hierarchies were created upon the settlement of
FulKe warlords in the region in the course of the eighteenth century. The
tripartite stratiﬁcation of FulKe society included highest-ranking freeborn
(riimKe); intermediary casted groups (nyeeyKe); and non-freeborn groups
(riimayKe and maccuKe) at the bottom. Freeborn, casted, and non-freeborn
groups to date are not permitted to intermarry and thus maintain their status
acquired at birth. The only exceptions to this have been hypergamous
marriages between freeborn men and slave concubines, which generate
persons of mixed descent. Although there have been several occupational
status groups among freeborn, this text focuses exclusively on former royal
families and their dependants, as in the Haayre region such hypergamous
marriages have been contracted only by royal elites.
Freedom to move was historically intertwined with social status. More
speciﬁcally, freedom of choice over how, when, why, and where to move has
been partly deﬁned by one’s place in local hierarchies at speciﬁc times and
places. In precolonial times (roughly up to ), royal freeborn elites
(former warlords called weheeKe in Fulfulde) thrived on slave labor and
continued control over the movements of slaves captured in warfare and raids.
As in many other stratiﬁed societies of the West African Sahel, precolonial
slavery included a considerable range of dependent positions, going from
 For a precise geographical description of this region, see M. E. de Bruijn and H. van
Dijk, ‘Drought and coping strategies in FulKe society in the Haayre (central Mali): a
historical perspective’, Cahiers d’études africaines, :/ (), –.
 M.E. de Bruijn and H. van Dijk, Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings of Insecurity in
FulKe Society, Central Mali (Amsterdam, ); M. E. de Bruijn and H. van Dijk,
‘Ecology and power in the periphery of Maasina: the case of the Hayre in the nineteenth
century’, Journal of African History, : (), ; M. E. de Bruijn and H. van Dijk,
‘Changing population mobility in West Africa: FulKe pastoralists in central and south
Mali’,African Aﬀairs, : (), –; and C. Angenent, A. Breedveld, M. E. de
Bruijn, and H. van Dijk (eds.), Les rois des tambours au Haayre: récitée per Aamadu Baa
Digi, griot des Fulsse à Dalla (Mali) (Leiden, ).
 Terminology related to mixed descent individuals in slave societies tends to reinforce
associations of slave descent with incompleteness or lack. Meillassoux uses the term
‘half-breeds’: C. Meillassoux, The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Iron and
Gold (London, ), –. I have previously used the notion of ‘semi-freeborn’: see L.
Pelckmans, Travelling Hierarchies: Roads In and Out of Slave Status in a Central Malian
FulKe Network (Leiden, ), –. An alternative French notion is ‘métissage
statutaire’: see M. Villesante-de Beauvais ‘La question des hiérarchies sociales et des
groupes serviles chez les bidân de Mauritanie’, in M. Villesante-de Beauvais (ed.),Groupes
serviles au Sahara: approche comparative à partir du cas des arabophones de Mauritanie
(Paris, ), –, esp. .
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slaves who had no say over their own bodies, to clients who worked
independently and paid taxes.The weheeKewere a relatively immobile group,
who looked down upon professions requiring mobility, such as trading,
transportation, and physical labor. They delegated these jobs to freeborn
commoners and slaves. Since these weheeKemasters were relatively immobile,
their domestic slaves were also rather immobile compared with other slave
groups, who accompanied their cattle herding or trading masters. Moreover,
if royal slaves were entrusted tasks that required mobility (for example, going
to the city to buy certain goods, assisting their masters in raids), they could
always command lower status slave groups to fulﬁll these tasks for them: like
their masters, royal slaves could delegate mobility to lower-status groups.
Not only before but also during colonial rule, freedom to move was
embedded in hierarchical power relations. But, for Mali in particular, the
majority of historical studies of slavery and mobility focus on the decades
directly following the legal abolition of slavery. Slaves’ mobility has been
analyzed as a strategy of emancipation: by moving out of the societies in
which they had been captured, slaves supposedly managed to get relative
freedom and installed themselves in cities or regions where the demand for
unskilled labor was high; labor migration has been considered in historical
studies of this period as a viable ‘road’ leading to emancipation.
However, the recent literature that links postcolonial migration to social
status in West African societies seems to point out how, in the longue durée,
the colonial abolition of slavery in  did not necessarily change people’s
social status, but rather their condition. Few slaves obtained enduring
emancipation from their status. Those who did leave were often forced to
 C. Meillassoux (ed.), L’esclavage en Afrique précoloniale (Paris, ).
 R. Roberts and M. A. Klein, ‘The Banamba slave exodus of  and the decline of
slavery in the western Sudan’, Journal of African History, : (), –.
 B. S. Hall, ‘Bellah highwaymen: slave banditry and crime in colonial northern Mali’,
in B. A. Mirzai, I.M. Montana, and P. E. Lovejoy (eds.), Slavery, Islam and Diaspora
(Trenton, NJ, ), –; F. Manchuelle, ‘Slavery, emancipation and labour
migration in West Africa: the case of the Soninke’, Journal of African History, :
(), –; F. Manchuelle, ‘The “patriarchal ideal” of Soninke labor migrants: from
slave owners to employers of free labor’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, : (),
–; F. Manchuelle, Willing Migrants: Soninke Labor Diasporas, – (Athens,
OH, ); Roberts and Klein, ‘The Banamba’; M. Rodet, ‘Migrants in French Sudan:
gender biases in the historiography’, in F. Toyin and A. Niyi (eds.), Trans-Atlantic
Migration: The Paradoxes of Exile (New York, ), –; M. Rodet, Les migrantes
ignorées du Haut-Sénégal: – (Paris, ).
 For example, see J.-G. Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition in German East
Africa, c. – (Oxford, ); M. A. Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule in French
West Africa (Cambridge, ); Manchuelle, Willing; and E. Pollet and G. Winter, ‘The
social organisation of agricultural labour among the Soninke (Dyahunu, Mali)’, in
D. Seddon (ed.), Relations of Production: Marxist Approaches to Economic Anthropology
(London, ), –.
 R. Botte, ‘“Esclaves et prolétaires”: les migrants soninkés en France’, Pensée,
 (), –; F. Boyer, ‘L’esclavage chez les Touaregs de Bankilaré au
miroir des migrations circulaires’, Cahiers d’études africaines, :/ (), –
; O. Leservoisier, ‘“Nous voulons notre part!” les ambivalences du mouvement
d’émancipation des Saafaalbe Hormankoobe de Djéol (Mauritanie)’, Cahiers d’études
africaines, :/ (), –; O. Leservoisier, ‘Contemporary trajectories of
slavery in Haalpulaar society (Mauritania)’, in Rossi (ed.), Reconﬁguring, –;
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engage as strangers in new relations of dependence elsewhere or came back
without the means to reformulate existing power relations. Meanwhile, those
who stayed behind instrumentalized their slave status and made claims on
historical reciprocity between masters and slaves. They were rarely able to
reconﬁgure the ideology from which they derived at least some social security
and, when lucky, also more material beneﬁts.
However, this article’s central argument wishes to underline is that social
status per se has limited analytical value in explaining trajectories of migration
and emancipation. The assumed links between migration and social status are
often much more complex, situation-bound, and contextual. To demonstrate
this, the analysis is based on the mobile trajectories of sedentary freeborn
‘masters’ and descendants of former domestic ‘slaves’ of the royal court in the
central Malian Haayre. The use of inverted commas suggests the anachronis-
tic use of the terms ‘slave’ and ‘master’ after legal status abolition. Yet these
groups are identiﬁed as ‘slaves’ and ‘masters’ in contemporary Haayre society
and are part of what has been termed categorical slavery.More speciﬁcally, a
particular substratum of the royal elite will be analyzed, that is the ‘mixed-
descent’ individuals. Mixed-descent individuals are children resulting from
the union between a freeborn man and a slave woman. In order to analyze the
unequal spread of mobility within social status groups of royal ‘slaves and
masters’ in postcolonial Mali, this article examines the trajectories of various
individuals over two generations (–). Data were collected in –
and – and are based on archival research and oral interviews with
members of a large FulKe family network.
The argument that there are limits to a linear and univocal interpretation
linking mobility to social status will be is made through three main sections.
A ﬁrst section sets out the putative historical interrelations between social
status and the mobility of royal elites in the Haayre region from precolonial
times to the present. The second section tests these presuppositions against
the actual trajectories of two mixed-descent children, called Muusa and
Haidi, arguing that they were discriminated against vis-à-vis their ‘pure’
freeborn peers of the royal court, and that this setting apart paradoxically
contributed to shaping particularly successful avenues of spatial and social
mobility that became available to them. In the long run, a combination of
factors such as access to French colonial education and postcolonial politics
made possible long-lasting social advancement for migrants of mixed descent.
The third and ﬁnal section describes how ultimately the trajectories of the
‘slaves’ belonging to individuals of mixed descent were closely intertwined,
Pelckmans, Travelling; M. Rodet, ‘Mémoires’; J .Schmitz, ‘Des migrants aux “notables”
urbains: les communautés transnationales des gens du ﬂeuve Sénégal (Sénégal/Mali/
Mauritanie)’, in E. Boesen and L. Marfaing (eds.), Les nouveaux urbains dans l’espace
Sahara-Sahel: un cosmopolitisme par le bas (Paris, ), –;  Y. Sy, ‘L’esclavage
chez les Soninkés: du village à Paris’, Journal des africanistes, :– (), –.
 For a precise deﬁnition of this categorical slavery, see B. Rossi, ‘Introduction:
Rethinking Slavery in West Africa’, in Rossi (ed.), Reconﬁguring, –.
 The name Dicko (also spelled as Dikko) was a praise name for the former warlords
who became political leaders in various sedentary FulKe constituencies of Central Mali (de
Bruijn and van Dijk, ‘Ecology’, ). Dicko literally translates as ‘falcon’ and refers to the
‘hunting’ instinct of this former warrior group.
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but dependent on and inferior to that of their ‘masters’ of mixed descent, thus
creating parallel roads for dependent status groups. The chosen approach is
both historical and anthropological and enables a long-term generational
overview of hierarchies both between and within existing social status groups.
The analysis underlines not only how complex the links between status and
mobility are, but also how extremely dependent they are on those local
dynamics that are often impossible for ‘classic’ historiography to fully take
into account.
H I S TO R I E S O F MO B I L I T Y : A S T R AT I F I E D FU L K E N E TWORK I N
TH E C ENT R A L MAL I A N HA AY R E R EG I ON
In the nineteenth century, several FulKe warriors established kingdoms in a
semi-arid region called Haayre (Fig. ). The word Haayre refers to the
rocky plateaus at the periphery of the Islamic FulKe Empire of Maasina.
Under the reign of Seku Ahmadu (–), these warriors protected the
Maasina Empire from raids and invasions from the north by Moroccan and
Tuareg groups. The areas over which these warlords ruled were peripheral to
the Maasina Empire and mainly served as a buﬀer zone to protect it.
Kingdoms like Joona, Kanyume, and Dalla (Fig. ) emerged owing to the
progressive sedentarization of the warriors, who gradually abandoned the
prototypical lifestyle associated with nomadic FulKe. Their economies thrived
on raiding and the surplus extracted from slave labor. Cultivation was a form
of slave labor delegated to the ﬁrst inhabitants of the region, who came to be
called RiimayKe, while domestic labor was delegated to war captives and
traded slaves, who were called MaccuKe. Slavery was a dominant feature of
these economies. Between  and  per cent of the population appears to
have consisted of slaves.
The kingdom of Dalla was the center of power in the Haayre, situated east
of the town of Douentza (Fig. ). Dalla reproduced the administrative and
social structure of the Maasina Empire, which was organized around slavery
and Islam.Warriors ‘mastered’ the mobility of their slaves – for example, by
deciding whether or not they could ﬁght as soldiers in raiding expeditions or
accompany their masters on pilgrimage. Some populations in the region
deferred voluntarily to FulKe warriors in order to seek protection; others had
been bought in slave markets in Bandiagara and Douentza. Many were
violently captured in raids and forced into slavery in their new host
 Klein, Slavery, .
 B. Sanankoua, Un empire peul au XIXe siècle: La Diina du Maasina (Paris, ).
 de Bruijn and van Dijk, Arid; Angenent, Breedveld, de Bruijn, and van Dijk, Les
rois.  Meillassoux, L’esclavage.
 de Bruijn and van Dijk, Arid.
 de Bruijn and van Dijk, ‘Ecology’, ; Angenent, Breedveld, de Bruijn, and van
Dijk, Les rois, –.
 See de Bruijn and van Dijk, ‘Drought’, –; Klein, Slavery, –; and
L. Pelckmans, ‘To cut the rope from one’s neck? manumission documents of slave
descendants from Central Malian FulKe society’, in A. Bellagamba, S. Green, and
M. Klein (eds.), The Bitter Legacy: African Slavery Past and Present (Princeton, ).
 de Bruijn and van Dijk, Arid.
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societies. Freeborn FulKe, just like many other ethnic groups in the Sahel,
were committed to the patriarchal ideal and the ideology of slavery.
Omar Tall’s Fuutanke empire overthrew that of Seku Amadu in the mid-
nineteenth century and thereby challenged the position of the ruling FulKe
families in the Haayre region. Later, from  onwards, the French
colonial abolition of the slave trade and then of slavery in , threatened the
control of freeborn families over their slaves. Oral sources mention how,
following internal strife, some families left Dalla and settled to the east in a
village today known as Booni (Fig. ). From the end of the nineteenth
century, Dalla had to share its power over the Haayre area with this ‘younger’
kingdom called Booni. Legal abolition probably stimulated slaves and
clients in colonial strongholds (urban areas like Bamako and places like
Banamba) to collectively leave their masters. However, colonial sources do
not mention massive departures of slaves in the Haayre region. This might be
linked to the lack of alternatives in this area, where possibilities for wage labor
were absent, and there were no ‘liberty villages’ nearby. Moreover, central
Fig. . The Gandamia plateau with Dalla and its direct surroundings.
 Angenent, Breedveld, de Bruijn, and van Dijk, Les rois, .
 P. E. Lovejoy, The Ideology of Slavery in Africa (London, ); Manchuelle, ‘The
“patriarchal ideal”’.  Klein, Slavery, –.
 M.E. de Bruijn and L. Pelckmans, ‘Facing dilemmas: former FulKe slaves in modern
Mali’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, : (), –.
 de Bruijn and van Dijk, ‘Ecology’, –.
 Roberts and Klein, ‘The Banamba’.
 Source: Archives Nationales Maliens, Bamako, (ANM), Fond Ancien (FA): E-:
Etats numériques de villages de liberté, Bandiagara (–); ANM FA E-:
Correspondances sur les villages de captifs libérés-Goundam ().
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Mali was situated at the periphery of French colonial Sudan, so the region
was therefore relatively under-equipped with colonial oﬃcers and the
control of the ruling elites over their populations and domestic slaves
remained ﬁrm.
Domestic slavery was criticized but accepted by the colonizers, who were
forced to rely on indirect rule through ‘traditional chiefs’ locally referred to
as kings (laamiiKe). French oﬃcers curbed the accumulation of new slaves,
but turned a blind eye to the resilience of domestic slavery among ruling royal
FulKe and Songhay families in this region. This is why these royal families
maintained power over their domestic slaves well into the s. Even
though new opportunities to migrate were created by the colonial regime,
local rulers such as the king of Dalla (–) eﬀectively curtailed the
freedom of movement of what oﬃcially continued to be ‘his domestic slaves’.
Rather than seeking emancipation, domestic ‘slaves’ were encouraged to work
and move in service of their powerful masters.
About three-quarters of the migrants to West African cities from the s
onwards were people of slave origins. Many ex-slaves proﬁted from new
opportunities and moved to large-scale plantations, such as those in the
‘Peanut Basin’ in Senegal and rice ﬁelds of the ‘Oﬃce du Niger’ on the banks
of the River Niger near Segou in Mali. The need for cash to pay for taxes
encouraged the labor migration of many. In the s and s the
harshness of French forced labor, combined with several plagues and
droughts, prompted slave descendants in French colonial Sudan to move to
British colonies such as the Gold Coast. In the Haayre region it was mainly
non-domestic slaves – those who lived at some distance from the direct
authority of the royal court, such as slaves belonging to traders, artisans, and
craftsmen –who engaged new opportunities to migrate. The royal domestic
slaves discussed in this text (the Kau family central to the third section) were
not able to join these emancipatory migrations until as late as the s.
Bound by hierarchical relations, they often followed their ‘masters’ of mixed
descent, who mobilized social dependents to accompany them on their own
travels.
 Angenent, Breedveld, de Bruijn, and van Dijk, Les rois; de Bruijn, and van Dijk,
‘Changing’; and B. Lecocq, ‘The bellah question: slave emancipation, race, and social
categories in late twentieth-century northern Mali’, Canadian Journal of African Studies,
: (), –.
 The word ‘king’ is used here because informants translate the Fulfulde notion of
laamiiFo in French as roi. By the same logic, the territorial areas reigned over by several
laamiiKe will be called ‘kingdoms’.
 See also Angenent, Breedveld, de Bruijn, and van Dijk, Les rois, ; Klein, Slavery,
.  Manchuelle,Willing, .
 B. Moitt, ‘Slavery and emancipation in Senegal’s peanut basin: the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, : (),
–; I. Dougnon, Travail de blanc, travail de noir: La migration des paysans dogon vers
l’oﬃce du Niger et au Ghana (–) (Paris, ), –.
 For an overview of literature on colonial labor migration in West Africa, see
Manchuelle,Willing, –.
 B. Fall, Le travail forcé en Afrique-Occidentale française, – (Paris, );
Klein, Slavery.  Dougnon, Travail.
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S O C I A L A S C ENT O F P E O P L E O F M I X ED D E S C ENT F ROM HAAY R E
ROYA L FAM I L I E S (    –   )
One important ‘road’ to social mobility created by the colonial government
was education. In central Mali, French colonial oﬃcers forced the elites with
whom they cooperated through indirect rule to have their children educated
in French schools. However, local elites were not keen to replace Islamic
teaching with French education; French colonial oﬃcers discovered that
freeborn elite families did not send their own children to French schools but
instead sent the children of slaves. French administrators consequently
imposed stricter controls to ensure that royal families would send their own
oﬀspring; faced with the task of choosing among their own children, the elite
of the Haayre region sent those children they considered most marginal: those
of mixed descent. During the s, the kings of the royal courts of Dalla
and Booni in the Haayre region sent the children of their slave concubines
(rather than of their freeborn wives) to French schools. But as the cases
discussed below will demonstrate, in an unexpected twist of fate and history,
French schooling marked an important turning point for these youths of
mixed descent.
Before describing the trajectories of mixed-descent individuals, however, it
is important to pay more attention to the speciﬁc status of this particular
group within the wider social status group of royal freeborn (weheeKe). Mixed
descent is a much more complex social status than is often assumed in the
literature. Malikite Islamic law stipulates that freeborn men are allowed to
marry no more than four freeborn women but can take several slave women as
concubines. Some scholars, like Ann McDougall, have emphasized how
being a slave concubine is ‘honorable for slave women in Islam’. Yet as Paul
Lovejoy stresses how being a freeborn wife was ‘preferable to being a
concubine’. Slave concubines thus remained inferior to freeborn wives of
the king. But in a patrilineal society like that of the FulKe, patrilineal descent
 de Bruijn and van Dijk , ‘Drought’; M. de Bruijn and H. van Dijk, ‘FulKe mobility:
Migration and travel into Mande’,Mande Studies,  (), –.
 A. Breedveld, ‘The rejection of formal education in the th region of Mali’, Mande
Studies,  () –; L. Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power, and
Schooling in a West African Muslim Society (Bloomington, IN, ); J.-H. Jézéquel,
‘Histoire des bancs, parcours d’élèves: pour une lecture “conﬁgurationnelle” de la
scolarisation à l’époque coloniale’, Cahiers D’Études Africaines :/ (), ;
J.-H. Jézéquel, ‘Les enseignants comme élite politique en AOF (–)’, Cahiers
d’études africaines, : (), –, esp. .
 Elsewhere, other logics were pursued. The Fuuta Tooro elites appropriated
education for themselves. See J. Schmitz, ‘Islamic patronage and republican
emancipation: The slaves of the Almaami in the Senegal River valley’, in Rossi,
Reconﬁguring, –, esp. .
 P. E. Lovejoy, ‘Concubinage and the status of women slaves in early colonial
northern Nigeria’, Journal of African History, : (), –, esp. .
 E. A. McDougall, ‘Dilemmas in the practice of rachat in French West Africa’, in
K. A. Appiah and M. Bunzl (eds.), Buying Freedom: The Ethics and Economics of Slave
Redemption (Princeton, ), –, esp. .
 Lovejoy, ‘Concubinage’, .
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deﬁnes social status, rights and obligations, and positions of honor. These
ideologies of honor are reinforced by Malikite legislation, which stipulates
that the children of marriages between free men and slave women are
considered free. According to this legal norm, having a slave mother is not be
an obstacle to social prestige.
But what happens when one compares this legal norm of status equality
with actual social practice? The children of some of these marriages in the
twentieth century enjoyed important political successes and were even the
favorite children. But there are no life histories of mixed-descent
individuals which clearly show that maternal slave descent could be
completely overcome at any time in their life cycle. Lovejoy writes that
these children ‘probably suﬀered some deprivation relative to their half
brothers and sisters born of free mothers’. The cases from central Mali
below show that children of free versus slave mothers were not always treated
as equals; particularly during childhood they were disadvantaged. This did
not, however, preclude success in the long run. Once they reached adulthood,
the mixed-descent individuals described in this text did obtain social mobility
thanks to speciﬁc external opportunities oﬀered by twentieth-century colonial
and postcolonial regimes.
The social mobility of mixed-descent individuals who did not pursue
emancipation through education and national politics is a neglected issue in
the historiography of both West and East Africa. Just as colonial legal
abolition of slavery did not abolish slave status in people’s minds and social
life, the legal free status of mixed-descent individuals in Islam did not take
away all ambiguities surrounding their status in social practice. Several
informants stigmatized the mixed-descent individuals I worked with from
time to time by reference to their maternal kin. However, they did so in
whispers and broke the silence on this topic only on rare and exceptional
occasions; such references are not made publicly, but rather secretly. In
short, while in outward, oﬃcial, and normative discourses status equality and
 M.A. Klein, ‘The concept of honour and the persistence of servility in the western
Soudan’, Cahiers d’études africaines, :/ (): –; Villesante-de Beauvais,
‘La question’, .
 E.K. Hahonou, ‘En attendant la décentralisation au Niger. . .: dynamiques locales,
clientélisme et culture politique’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Ecoles de Hautes Études en
Sciences Sociales Paris, ), ; P. Valsecchi, ‘My dearest child is my slave child:
personal status and the politics of succession in south-west Ghana (nineteenth and
twentieth centuries)’, in A. Bellagamba, C. Brown, S. Greene, and M. Klein (eds.), Voices
of Slavery in West Africa (Trenton, NJ, ).
 Y. Wane, Les Toucouleur du Fouta Tooro (Sénégal): Stratiﬁcation sociale et structure
familiale (Dakar, ), ; P. A. Igbafe, ‘Slavery and emancipation in Benin, –
’, Journal of African History, : (), –, esp. .
 See Valsecchi, ‘My dearest’; and Hahonou, ‘En attendant’.
 Lovejoy, ‘Concubinage’, quote on .
 Often references to mixed descent individuals in West Africa are about their political
success, see Hahonou ,‘En attendant’, ; Valsecchi, ‘My dearest’. Cooper, however,
noted that the oﬃcial equality between children sharing the same father was tempered by
racism on the Swahili coast: F. Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa
(New Haven, CT, ).
 A. Zempleni, ‘Savoir taire: du secret et de l’intrusion ethnologique dans la vie des
autres’, Gradhiva,  (), –.
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the relative advantage of mixed-descent individuals are underlined, in private
conversations and daily practice, the slave origins of their mothers handicap
these mixed-descent individuals.
The cases that follow show that a study of mixed descent opens a window
on actual diﬀerentiations within status groups conventionally assumed to be
internally homogenous. Even within legally ‘free’ groups, hierarchical logics
operate, just as they do across ‘slave’ and ‘free’ groups. The argument is thus
that these internal stratiﬁcations, rather than social status per se, explain the
speciﬁc roads that individuals could follow.
M I X ED -D E S C ENT T R A J E C TO R I E S : T H E CA S E O F
MUU S A AND HA I DU
Muusa Dicko (–) and Haidu Dicko (–) were the children
of King Yerowal of Dalla (–). King Yerowal had several mixed-
descent children because he married two slave concubines called Faata and
Pendolde (see Figs.  and ). When he took them, they were still considered
‘slaves’ in Haayre society, although the French colonizers had legally
abolished slavery at the time of his marriage in the s.
When the French recruited students among the royal family, the king chose
to send only the children he had with one slave concubine (Faata, Fig. ) and
none of his mixed-descent children with the other slave concubine (Pendolde,
Fig. ). Pendolde’s father was called Kau (Fig. ). He was a royal domestic
Fig. . Mixed descent Muusa Yerowal Dicko, descendant of King Yerowal and
slave concubine Faata.
 Although slave groups generally had no single and ﬁxed patronym as freeborn status
groups do, informants from Dalla refer to this particular slave family by the name of their
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slave and had been the king’s most trusted slave and advisor. It is in this
privileged position that hemanaged to bring up eight healthy children, among
whom was the beautiful Pendolde. Since Pendolde was the daughter of a
highly esteemed domestic slave, her children enjoyed a higher social standing
than those of Faata (Fig. ). King Yerowal valued the children he had with
Pendolde, his sixth slave concubine, much more highly than those with Faata.
Moreover, the descendants of Pendolde have been very successful in concealing
their slave origins. During my ﬁrst ﬁeldwork period in , I was unaware of
their maternal slave descent and considered them of noble descent.
The diﬀerentiated status of the slave concubines was translated into a
pecking order among their children of mixed descent. King Yerowal sent two
mixed-descent sons (Muusa and Nassuru) with his concubine Faata to school.
Nassuru died very young, but the trajectory of Muusa will be explained
below. Faata was a low-status slave originally from a poor village in the
surroundings of Yerowal’s kingdom. Faata’s grandmother was a Songhay
woman who had been captured and enslaved at the end of the nineteenth
century. According to Islamic prescriptions, Faata should have become free
upon marriage or once she gave birth to children with the king. Claude
Meillassoux has indicated that the emancipation of slave women before giving
birth (often on the occasion of marriage with a freeborn master) was an
important condition for the liberty of their children. However, several
Fig. . Mixed-descent Haidu Yerowal Dicko, descendant of King Yerowal and
slave concubine Pendolde of the Kau family.
common slave ancestor Kau. Kau literally means ‘uncle’ in Fulfulde language. Ancestor
Kau was a war captive who became a domestic slave for the royal court.
 de Bruijn and Pelckmans, ‘Facing’, .
 Meillassoux, Anthropology, .
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informants conﬁrm that Faata was never married by the king and was socially
considered free only when her husband died. As long as her husband the
king was alive, slave concubine Faata was discriminated against within the
royal harem. Unlike freeborn wives, she had to do domestic labor and
received less attention from her husband. In fact, the condition of this slave
concubine was thus hardly better than that of her slave kin. The shameful
position of their mother exposed Faata’s children to ridicule from their ‘pure’
freeborn peers. As Meillassoux notes explicitly, ‘it must be remembered that
this progeny, although freeborn, was weakened by the absence of a maternal
lineage’. It is precisely this weakened position that has been often overlooked.
In the cases under analysis here, it was especially during childhood that social
practice diﬀered from oﬃcial legal discourses and norms.
Sending out slave or mixed-descent children for French school education
was, however, not necessarily standard procedure in the wider Haayre
area. This recalls J.-H. Jézéquel’s argument for a ‘conﬁgurational approach’
whereby ‘multiple registers of causality’ need to be combined. In contrast to
the Haayre kingdoms of Dalla and Booni, other kings in the region, such as
Joona and Hombori (Fig. ), sent their ‘pure’ freeborn sons to French secular
schools. Hamadoun Dicko (–), for example, was the ﬁrstborn of the
king in Joona and a freeborn wife. Hamadoun enjoyed French education at
the ‘Lycée de Terrasson de Fougères à Bamako’. Hamadoun had a very
successful but short-lived career. While teaching in Bafoulabe (Kolokani) he
was asked by the Parti Soudanais Progressiste (PSP) – one of the ﬁrst Malian
political parties, which was aﬃliated to the French Socialist Party – to be
‘député du Sudan’. In , aged , Hamadoun moved to France, where
he fulﬁlled several functions as secretary and deputy minister of diﬀerent
departments, reﬂecting his personal interest in education and research: he was
secretary of the national assembly and became deputy minister of industry
and commerce; in  he became deputy minister in charge of the advisory
board of scientiﬁc research and technical progress; from  onwards, he was
the state secretary of French Overseas territories, and in  occupied the
position of state secretary of national education. Although a rising star in
colonial and later national politics in the s, HamadounDicko’s career was
cut short. In , under the ﬁrst Malian republic, Hamadoun and other
prominent PSP leaders were condemned to death because the Keita regime
considered PSP members to be enemies of the state as a result of their
collaboration with the French. They were sent to workcamps in Kidal,
 McDougall, ‘Dilemmas’, esp. .
 Interview with Allay Jangine, Dalla,  Jan. . This is conﬁrmed in interviews
with Penda, sister of slave concubine Faata Legal, Dalla,  Dec.  and with Burra
Yero Cisse, Douentza,  May .  Jézéquel, ‘Histoire’, .
 ‘Hamadoun Dicko, pionnier des indépendances’, in L’Écho du Mali: Trimestriel
d’Information des Maliens de France (Ambassade du Mali en France),  (), .
 PSP was considered the party of traditional elites that maintained the ideology of
slavery. Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA), in contrast, was known as the
party of the teachers. See Jézéquel, ‘Les enseignants’, .
 Based on archival research by Anonymous, ‘Hamadoun’.
 ‘A Bamako Mouvement de protestation contre la reforme monétaire’, Le Monde, 
juillet , ; ‘Deux personnalités politiques Soudanais arrêtées à Bamako’, LeMonde, 
juillet , .
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where the governing political party of US-RDA probably killed Hamadun
Dicko in .
Hamadoun’s political ambitions and career were a source of inspiration for
Muusa Dicko, who, by marrying Hamadoun’s sister InaWuro as his ﬁrst wife
(Fig. ), hoped to strengthen his bonds with Hamadoun’s family. With this
marriage Muusa assured himself a strategic position among the royal freeborn
Dickos of the former kingdom of Joona (Fig. ). Moussa’s emphasis on
marriages with patrilineal kin also contributed to distancing himself even
more from his maternal slave kin. Owing to his in-law relation with
Hamadoun, Muusa also became a target for the US-RDA government, who
considered not only Hamadoun Dicko but all related Dicko families to be
enemies of the state. Muusa Dicko, for example, was forced to move and teach
for short periods of some months in the smallest villages in the most remote
regions of Mali. Successive short-term appointments in remote areas were a
fate many Dicko family members faced in this period. This practice ended
only after Musa Traore’s putsch in , when members of the former Keita
regime were persecuted in their turn.
The mobile educational trajectories of both Hamadoun and Muusa
deconstruct existing linear assumptions about schooling, mobility, and social
status. While in classical historiography it is assumed that mainly slaves were
sent to schools, the cases above demonstrate how in the Haayre region it was
mainly those with freeborn or freed status (elite and mixed-descent children)
who were sent to school, rather than those with slave status. In what follows,
the trajectory of Muusa’s half-brother Haidu will demonstrate how
immobility could also contribute to social mobility. Haidu’s trajectory
shows how spatial mobility was not the only avenue to social mobility and
nuances the idea that ‘having a road’ is necessarily related to nomadism (in
earlier times) or migrations (more recently).
Back home in Dalla, the death of King Yerowal in  generated major
social changes. Conﬂicts over the succession to the throne led to a brutal
murder among competing freeborn Dicko brothers. After this terrible event,
a neutral and low-key candidate was selected in an attempt to temper internal
divisions among the royal members of the Dicko lineage. The choice fell on
Haidu, son of the king and slave concubine Pendoolde Kau (Fig. ).
Informants of slave descent indicate that Haidu was elected not only because
he was the eldest amongst the eligible male Dicko family members, but also
because his mixed descent gave him a low proﬁle among the rivaling ‘pure’
freeborn family members. Everyone agreed to elect Haidu, who had never
previously shown any interest in politics and spent much of his time herding.
His humble position within the Dicko family made him an acceptable
compromise for all parties. The advantages were twofold. First of all, the pure
freeborn members of the royal court did not feel threatened by the ‘humblest’
 Interview with Mawludu Dicko, Bamako,  Nov. ; Interview with Muusa
Dicko, Douentza, ; Interview with Samba Dicko, Bamako, ; L’Essor special
issue, ‘Mali ’, (), with a picture of Hamadoun Dicko on p. . See also,
‘Hamadoun’, –; ‘Le PSP et le  juillet , Rappeler aux Maliens les crimes
commis’, Soir de Bamako,  août ; ‘Evènements du  juillet , le PSP réclame la
vérité’, L’Essor,  août .
 Based on Muusa Dicko’s life history. Personal correspondence between Dicko and
De Bruijn and van Dijk, .  Interview with Mawludu Dicko.
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among them. His status was ‘corrupted’ by his maternal slave descent, and
therefore he was not considered as threatening a rival as other freeborn
candidates. Second, in a period of major challenges over existing power
positions in the context of decolonization and the socialist regime of Modibo
Keita, Haidu’s maternal background was considered an advantage, as it
would ﬁnd some support amongst populations of slave descent in the region.
Haidu thus installed himself in the house where the drums that represent
royal power were kept and allied himself with the political party of ADEMA.
In Haidu’s case, it was mixed descent at a speciﬁc historical conjuncture of
conﬂict that turned him into the ideal candidate for chiefdom in the s.
Meanwhile, the trajectory of Muusa Dicko abroad also contributed to a
slowly emerging successful career. Muusa’s French education throughout the
years enabled him to reposition himself among the ‘pure’ freebornmembers of
the royal family back home in Dalla. In the s and s, the dictatorial
regime ofTraore did not bringmuch betterment for anyone. ButMuusaDicko
maintained a stable job as a teacher in several Malian cities. Although this did
not make him rich, he was wealthy compared with his co-villagers. Muusa
decided to marry a second wife and chose to ally himself with Booni’s royal
family. He also maintained close contacts with Mustaphe Dicko, a mixed-
descent member of the former kingdom of Booni, who had also been sent to
French schools and was an ADEMA adherent. In the s, Mustaphe was
making a career as Mali’s ambassador in Burkina Faso. During school
holidays, Muusa andMustaphe often met. Thanks to their relative wealth and
salaried government jobs, both men gained inﬂuence over their freeborn
relatives in their home communities. Their ‘pure’ freeborn brothers and sisters
who once discriminated against them on the basis of their maternal slave
background now sought their assistance and wealth. In contrast to Joona, in
bothDalla and Boonimixed-descent individuals had achievedmore successful
educational or political careers than freeborn members of the royal families.
While the droughts of the s and s, in combination with the
dictatorial regime, were a disaster for many, they paradoxically brought
important opportunities to the Haayre region. By the early s, new NGOs
brought money and administrative functions to small peripheral towns like
Douentza (Fig. ), which had been overwhelmed by the inﬂux of starving
rural poor. Some school-educated individuals of mixed descent, among them
Muusa and Mustaphe Dicko, returned to the Douentza province to take
advantage of new job opportunities, enabling them to ﬁnally work in their home
area.DuringAlphaOumarKonaré’s regime (–),MustapheDickowas
one of the ﬁrst school-educated persons from the village of Booni to be elected
member of parliament for the Douentza province. Like Muusa Dicko, he
encouraged his fellow family members and co-villagers to educate themselves,
and in his position as anMP he supported the construction of school buildings
in the rural communities of Dalla and Booni. He also provided for a secondary
school in Douentza, where Muusa Dicko became headmaster.
 This echoes Meillassoux’s argument about the slave as an ‘anti-kin’: Meillassoux,
Anthropology, .
 R. Zondag, ‘Douentza: the dynamics of a rural centre in the semi-arid Sahel’, in
M. E. de Bruijn, H. van Dijk, M. Kaag, and K. van Til (eds.), Sahelian Pathways: Climate
and Society in Central and South Mali (Leiden, ), –.
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In , Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) was elected president of Mali.
Under ATT, the Dicko family occupied various positions in government. In
, Muusa Dicko became the ﬁrst elected mayor of the decentralized rural
community of Dalla in central Mali. This was surely humiliating to his ‘pure’
freeborn family members, who were illiterate and thus legally excluded from
running for this oﬃce. Muusa’s election can be explained by the fact that he
was the sole school-educated Dicko from the village of Dalla in his generation;
moreover, his mixed descent provided him with a large electorate among
people of slave descent. The Kau family (Fig. ), for example, voted for
Muusa Dicko out of loyalty to his maternal slave ancestry.
Paradoxically, it is in this speciﬁc time period that mixed descent from a
slave mother (Fig. ) gave Muusa access to the fullest form of political
legitimacy. When he returned after many years to his home area in the s,
his physical mobility and mixed descent had opened a ‘road’ for him.
Although the road was initially spatial (he moved in order to get French
education and later on to teach), what actually brought social mobility to
Muusa was his insertion in speciﬁc socioeconomic ﬁelds (French education,
political patronage) where slave descent was not relevant. The personal
trajectory of social mobility for Muusa Dicko, who died in , contributed
to the careers of his children and descendants. Muusa Dicko’s eldest daughter
Madame Dicko (Fig. ) was, for example, elected member of parliament for
Douentza province in .
In summary, the life history of Muusa Dicko shows that the ‘road’ to
education oﬀered by the French colonial regime was an important one for
mixed-descent children of the former royal courts in the Haayre region. Upon
independence, it gave this generation the skills necessary to engage salaried
government employment, making them rich and empowering them by
comparison with freeborn families back home. Those royal ‘pure’ freeborn
who had shunned education came to understand that sending slaves or
children of mixed descent to schools had given these formerly marginal and
‘impure’ children a double advantage. The speciﬁc historical conjuncture of
the s– in which mixed-descent Dickos like Muusa and Mustaphe were
inserted in French education proved to ‘have given them a road’. Colonial
rule and mixed descent had forced them into trajectories which, in the long
run, oﬀered them social mobility. But spatial and social mobility were
experienced rather diﬀerently. The latter is obviously desirable; the former
was initially experienced more as a form of exile. Muusa’s social mobility
was not only passed on to his children, who had successful political careers,
but (as will be discussed in the next section) it also had a lasting eﬀect for their
dependants of (full) slave descent.
P A R A L L E L ROAD S O F DOME S T I C ‘ S L AV E S ’ AT TACH ED TO
‘MA ST E R S ’ O F M I X ED D E S C ENT
This section and the next discuss the ‘roads’ available to three royal slave
descendants related to former masters of mixed descent. These royal slave
descendants are called Macca, Souleymane, and Allay. I will point out that
 For a similar argument in the Ghanaian context, see Valsecchi, ‘My dearest’.
 Personal correspondence between Dicko and de Bruijn and van Dijk, .
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the roads of both ‘masters’ and ‘slaves’ run parallel – and that the movement
of one group initiated that of the other. The beginning of movement and the
moment that roads became available for mixed-descent individuals also
heralded the start of movement for the subordinate ‘slave’ groups belonging
to them. Nevertheless, the opportunities and activities on the roads of each
social status group were very diﬀerent, as will be shown through a description
of the parallel ‘roads’ of ‘slaves’ Allay and Macca, who acted as Muusa
and Haidu’s personal assistants. A comparison between diﬀerent forms of
migration is illustrated with the example of Souleymane, who shifted between
independent labor migrations and dependent movements while following his
patrons.
In order to understand the relative status positions of the slave descendants
Allay, Macca, and Souleymane, the manner and timing of their acquisition as
slaves needs to be explained. When King Yerowal died in , both Muusa
and Haidu with their mixed-descent position were entitled to inherit
domestic slaves from their father, just like ‘pure’ freeborn children at the
royal court. However, the kind of slaves these mixed-descent sons inherited
illustrates the subtle discriminations they faced. Both Muusa and Haidu
Dicko inherited ‘slaves’ with a rather marginal status when compared with
other royal domestic slaves. The ancestors of most royal domestic slaves had
been captured in raids of the nineteenth century and had already spent several
generations in the service of the royal court. In contrast, Muusa Dicko’s
inherited slave Allay was recently incorporated, having been given as a pawn
to King Yerowal in the s by a tradesman who could not pay his taxes: the
practice of using slaves as payment or pawns continued well after the colonial
abolition of slavery in .
Since slaves tended to reproduce hierarchies among themselves, the
second-generation royal domestic slaves like those of the Kau family (Fig. )
initially looked down upon the pawned slave Allay. His former master was
‘but a tradesman’ and hence Allay enjoyed inferior social standing amongst
other ‘slaves’ of the royal family. Mixed-descent Haidu also inherited a
‘slave’, called Macca Maiga, from his father, the king. This man, Macca
Maiga, was born as a domestic ‘slave’ in Hombori, among the ethnic group of
Songhay. Macca Maiga ended up in Dalla owing to the marriage of his
Songhay mistress with the king. Macca’s mistress died young, and since he
initially spoke a diﬀerent language, Macca had diﬃculties integrating among
the much longer-settled domestic slaves of the royal court, who refused him a
wife. Macca was thus marginal among royal slaves due to his diﬀerent ethnic
background, and this probably also explains why he was given to Haidu
Dicko, a marginal member of mixed descent in the freeborn group.
Muusa and Haidu both inherited fewer slaves than their freeborn peers for
the simple reason that their maternal family could not provide them any. This
again was a social disadvantage in comparison with their ‘pure’ freeborn
brothers and sisters, who inherited former slaves and dependants from both
 Ahmadou Hamidou Dicko (Junior), Feb. ; P. E. Lovejoy and T. Falola (eds.),
Pawnship, Slavery, and Colonialism in Africa (Trenton, NJ, ); P. E. Lovejoy and D.
Richardson, ‘The business of slaving: pawnship in Western Africa, c. –’, Journal
of African History, : (), –.
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sides of their kin. The issue of ‘slave’ inheritance thus demonstrates how
mixed-descent sons were treated as inferior to sons born of freeborn women.
One might expect that mixed-descent individuals who were the ﬁrst
generation of their maternal families to have escaped slave status would be the
last persons to reproduce the ideology of slavery. However, somewhat
ironically, mixed-descent Dicko migrants like Muusa and Mustaphe seem to
have an even higher need to prove their authority than their ‘pure’ freeborn
family members. Since they obtained good salaries and promising jobs, they
attracted clients among former slaves of diﬀerent (often impoverished)
freeborn families. Even though both Muusa and Mustaphe did not live next
to the families of the ‘slaves’ they inherited, they recruited girls from slave-
descended families in their home region to assist them as domestics in their
urban compounds. Once these girls moved to Bamako at the demand of
these patrons, they were subjected to strict hierarchical diﬀerentiation.
Nevertheless, this form of ‘dependent mobility’ alongside wealthy patrons
was for these girls one of the few possible roads to labor migration.
Even though they both stayed home, Allay and Macca over time managed
to share in the social mobility of their mixed-descent ‘masters’. When Muusa
Dicko became mayor of Dalla in , Allay Jangine was appointed chief of
the former royal domestic slaves. Macca, who was not even entitled to marry a
wife among the royal domestic slaves, became one of the richest inhabitants of
the royal ‘slave’ ward in Dalla. Chief Haidu had often generously rewarded
Macca for his assistance and this is how Macca managed to get his son a
complete school education. In  his son was working as a teacher in the
Haayre region. The cases of Allay and Macca illustrate how – just like their
initially stigmatized mixed-descent patrons – these two newcomers among the
royal slaves obtained relatively privileged positions thanks to their alliance
with mixed-descent individuals. The royal domestic ‘slaves’, who initially
excluded them, came to respect these former outsiders and were even
expected to obey them.
In what follows, the trajectory of the slightly younger-generation
Souleymane Dauda Kau (Fig. ) demonstrates the dilemmas the current
generation of royal slave descendants faces: instrumentalizing slave status and
engaging in dependent mobility, or renouncing this form of social security
and cultivating emancipation with all the risks that total independence and
the status of ‘stranger’ abroad can bring about.
H AV I NG A RO AD A S A D E S C END ANT O F ROYA L DOME S T I C
S L AV E S : L A B O R M IG R AT I O N OR D E P END ENT MO B I L I T Y ?
Since the entry into labor migration of the former domestic slaves of the royal
family such as the descendants of Kau (Fig. ) came quite late, they started
 For an example of Muusa’s ideas about how the ‘rope of slavery is still there’, see de
Bruijn and Pelckmans, ‘Facing’, .
 For more on domestic workers among the Dicko family in Bamako, see Pelckmans,
Travelling, – and Pelckmans, ‘Memoryscapes of slavery? dependent mobility by
‘related’ domestic workers in FulKe elite families in Mali’, in J. Quirk and D. Vigneswaran
(eds.), Slavery, Migration and Contemporary Bondage in Africa (Trenton, NJ, ),
–.
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their migration careers at a disadvantage compared with other migrants.
Even though for some of these Kau migrants – such as Souleymane – labor
migration was quite lucrative, it did not provide them with roads to social
advancement. Another option was ‘dependent mobility’ – that is, mobility
that depends on the mobility of other (higher) status groups. In the latter
case, the mobility of royal domestic slaves was organized ‘top down’; higher-
status groups moved ﬁrst and initiated a ‘downward social spread of
migration’. The case of Souleymane will demonstrate why this can be an
interesting option.
Souleymane is a grandson of Kau, a central ancestor of the royal domestic
slaves (Fig. ). Souleymane’s ﬁrst opportunity to move out of his home village
Dalla came when Samba Dicko, son of Muusa Dicko, went to study at the
University of Abuja in Nigeria and ‘recruited’ Souleymane Kau as a personal
assistant. For Souleymane this was a unique chance to move out of the village
and see something of the world. In Nigeria, he made tea and prepared food
for Samba, who could thus devote all his time to studying. When Samba
completed his studies, their paths separated for some time. Samba settled in
Bamako, where he married a freeborn woman from the royal branch of the
Dicko family in Joona and, thanks to his education, obtained a position with
the World Bank.
Souleymane’s assistance was no longer needed once his patron Samba
obtained a job and married (his wife brought a former slave to do domestic
work). Souleymane thus decided to spend some years working as a migrant
farm laborer in Burkina Faso. He married the daughter of Allay Jangine,
whose social advancement as personal assistant of Muusa had turned his
daughters into prestigious marriage candidates. He settled with his new wife
as a cultivator in Burkina Faso, but then returned home to Dalla in  to
educate his children. Retrospectively, Souleymane explains how his labor
migration did not bring him much social mobility. He earned more money,
but back home he faced the fate of many other migrants of slave descent: his
remittances did not suﬃce to buy his own land. Not owning one’s land means
remaining dependent on renting land from the royal family. This requires
him to consciously perpetuate, and instrumentalise his status as the
descendant of royal slaves.
Since labor migration did not change his social status, Souleymane re-
engaged in dependent mobility for both Muusa and Samba Dicko.
Souleymane regularly moved to Samba’s family compound in Bamako,
where he worked as a butcher (an occupation usually associated with ‘slave’
status). Back home in Dalla, mayor Muusa charged Souleymane with the task
of distributing voting cards in the various former slave villages surrounding
the rural community of Dalla (Fig. ). In addition, Souleymane’s eldest
daughter Aaﬁ engaged in dependant mobility: she was transferred to Muusa
Dicko’s compound in Douentza as a domestic worker. In exchange, she could
reside and eat for free in Douentza, which was the only option for this family
of slave descendants to help her ﬁnish her secondary schooling.
Finally, Souleymane decided to instrumentalise his slave status and ﬁrst
supported Muusa and later on his daughter Madame Dicko during their
 This corresponds more or less to ‘subordinate movement’ in Niger, described by
Rossi, ‘Slavery’, .  Manchuelle,Willing, , .
‘HAVING A ROAD ’
municipal and parliamentary election campaigns. Souleymane’s brother
Amadu also campaigned for Madame among labor migrants of slave descent
in Bamako. During municipal elections in Dalla (), both of them had
expected a reward for their assistance and were very disappointed to end up
only in the seventh position of the community council, which is the classic
position for those of slave origin (freeborn groups traditionally occupy
positions one to six): once again, their social status had proved an
insurmountable barrier to achieving certain positions of authority.
From these trajectories of slave descendants, it can be concluded that those
working in the service of mixed-descent migrants proﬁted from both the
spatial and social mobility of their patrons. The cases of Allay and Macca
demonstrate how just like their stigmatized mixed-descent freeborn patrons,
these initially stigmatized royal domestic slaves obtained the highest degrees
of social mobility. Souleymane’s case demonstrates that for those slave
descendants whose patrons were wealthy and successful, dependent mobility
was a more rewarding road to social mobility than independent labor
migration. These former slaves’ ‘roads’ to social mobility ran parallel to those
of their successful patrons of mixed descent, and underline the enduring
importance of patronage in the West African Sahel.
T H E ROAD S THAT L I NK S O C I A L S TATU S AND S P AT I A L MOB I L I T Y
In theories of migration, spatial mobility is often equated with emancipation
and social mobility. This article goes against this modern, unilinear, and
teleological understanding of social change. It does so by locating life
trajectories in the internal diﬀerentiations among social status groups. The
generational approach chosen here allows the investigation of multiple
registers of change in speciﬁc times and spaces, explaining people’s
contextualized embeddings in the internal hierarchy of their particular social
status group. The cases demonstrate that it is at the interface of individual
performance, meso-insertion in social relations and macro-conditions, that
people ‘have roads’ in terms of access to opportunity structures in politics,
administration, education, and the monetary economy. This ‘conﬁgurational
approach’ privileges the social agency of individuals who are not passive in the
face of legal structures.
The ﬁrst section debunked the idea that movement is necessarily linked to
social status. By analyzing the social history of two families over several
generations, the internal diversity of apparently homogenous social status
groups was emphasized. Instead of taking for granted common identities
underlying ascribed social status, this article demonstrates how the internal
power struggles within social status groups explain best the silent changes
taking place. In so doing, it highlights the shifts under the surface of apparent
continuities in the social landscape of hierarchies in the Sahel. Hierarchical
relations and ascribed social status are ‘denaturalised’ by focusing on mixed-
descent individuals.
The introduction started with a short sketch of how the Dicko family, who
are of freeborn warrior status, had maintained political positions in a small
 Phone interviews with Muusa junior Dicko, Demba Dicko, and Ahmadou Hamidou
Dicko (Junior),  May ,  Apr. ,  Sept. .
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village of central Mali. Although this particular freeborn group has
maintained key political positions over the past century, the analysis
demonstrated how signiﬁcant internal renegotiation over power within the
group had occurred. While before, ‘pure’ freeborn lineages occupied political
positions, today it is mixed-descent individuals and their descendants who
occupy the central political positions of chief and mayor. Paradoxically, today
the ‘pure’, immobile, freeborn rely on mixed-descent individuals to ensure
the leadership position of their social status group in village politics.
Analytically conﬂating mixed-descent individuals with their freeborn peers
would have obscured these signiﬁcant internal power shifts not only within
the status group of the royal Dicko family, but also between the social status
group of royal slave-descendant families deferring to them. By demonstrating
how the legal status of mixed descent does not entirely correspond to freeborn
status, the analysis opened the door for future discussions by historians about
the life histories and actual status of slave concubines and their mixed-descent
children. More speciﬁcally, the trajectories of less successful mixed-descent
children could be an important counterpoint to analyses that so far have
focused on advantages of mixed-descent individuals.
The second argument against any linear and causal relation between
mobility and social change has been made by deconstructing mobility as an
element of emancipatory progress only. The emic expression of ‘having a
road’ encourages one to see opportunity as a continuum: it is an itinerary that
can temporarily be moved in or out of, depending on one’s position in space
and time. The road can be travelled both back and forth, and social change in
post-slavery societies is not about unidirectional, one-way itineraries that
eventually lead to adopting a new (freeborn) status. It is not mobility per se
which has oﬀered opportunities for citizens of slave descent in West Africa
(and elsewhere) to emancipate themselves. The notion of ‘parallel roads’
points out how the spatial and social mobilities of diﬀerent social status
groups have been, and continue to be, interlinked. The clients of wealthy
patrons engage in a form of mobility that depends on the movement of their
patrons. This reﬂects the ways in which freeborn masters in the past
controlled the mobility of their slaves and can be considered the postcolonial
version of ‘mastering’ the mobility of dependants.
Access to mobility is thus clearly hierarchical and stratiﬁed. But although
social status in local hierarchies is rather ‘sticky’ when it comes to possibilities
to migrate, it is not determining. The life histories of slave descendants
demonstrate how mobility – in the form of labor migration, for example –
does not bring full emancipation from their social status. Migration has far
more ambiguous outcomes than the expression ‘having a road’ suggests. The
roads to social and spatial mobility of former master and slave groups
remain structurally embedded in a shared history of hierarchical inter-
dependence. To continue the metaphor of the road, the labor migration of the
Kau family is comparable to a small winding path, along which dependence is
often the tax levied by mixed-origin Dickos for granting access to education
and/or social mobility.
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